The first guest with whom we had an important conversation was Pavlo Klimkin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (2014–2019). We discussed with Pavlo Klimkin the prospects and challenges of “peaceful” negotiations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the diplomatic aspects of the war and subsequent peace.
What security guarantees does Ukraine need? What do the statements about the interim results of the negotiations mean at this stage? What role can China play in this war, and what are the real goals of the Russian intervention? See the answers in the discussion notes. Our graduates asked these questions during the discussion.
On the world security and Russian threat
At some point, Western leaders’ rhetoric omitted the concept of territorial integrity of Ukraine as a separate value, with which they justified the need to help Ukraine before the start of the full-scale invasion. Does this change in rhetoric mean that there is another non-public consensus as to the fact that the West is ready to close its eyes to any territorial concessions other than those that have already taken place before 24 February and those that may take place in the future?
The two factors – the COVID-2019 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian war started the reboot of the 20th century in the 21st. All those systems and architectural elements created after the Second World War are now pathologically dysfunctional. It is important to understand that returning to the status quo of European security and, moreover, global security is impossible.
There is an understanding that, first, Russia is no longer just a threat but a revanchist regime; second, Russia is a country where everything is done by Putin only; it is a pure dictatorship, not even an authoritarian state in the sense of foreign policy; third, the prejudice was not confirmed that the Russian population would not support the war if it was full-scale.
Only now has it become clear to everyone that this is not Putin, not some union of clans surrounded by Putin; this is Russia as it is. Awareness came that this Russia cannot be treated the way it was before; its containment makes no sense. But the main thing is that commitment to the model of economic interdependence, which was especially prevalent in Germany, did not guarantee the avoidance of aggressive actions by Russia.
The West has become more united since the full-scale invasion, but it has not changed. However, changes are inevitable. The West faces the acute problem of Putin’s dictatorship and China’s mega-challenge, which is still considered the challenge of the 21st century.
On the position of the West regarding Ukraine
At some point, Western leaders’ rhetoric omitted the concept of territorial integrity of Ukraine as a separate value, with which they justified the need to help Ukraine before the start of the full-scale invasion. Does this change in rhetoric mean that there is another non-public consensus as to the fact that the West is ready to close its eyes to any territorial concessions other than those that have already taken place before 24 February and those that may take place in the future?
Today, I do not see any consensus in the West to legally give something from Ukraine to Russia. I understand that the complete restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity is possible under the condition of global events, such as Russia’s reboot. In the West, they say directly, although not publicly, that as a result of this war, if Russia collapses socially, economically, militarily, or as the result of other processes, then it will be possible to rely on the return of Crimea. In this sense, the answer is definite: territorial integrity is not declared during war as the principle.
We are also aware that we do not yet have weapons to carry out attacking operations to return to Crimea. This requires a completely different attacking weapon and intelligence provision, but most importantly, understanding that such an operation will be considered by the Russian regime as the “capture of a part of Russia,” which means that it requires a completely different level of preparation. Today, and I emphasize, today, I do not see any consensus in the West to support such an operation. This must be said honestly regarding what we can and cannot do.
The role of China in the war
Can a player like China act as a guarantor for the non-use of nuclear weapons, interfere in some way, or will it stand aside and wait for the time to start its own global conflict with the West?
China is now very uncomfortable with everything that Putin started. According to many indicators, China is ready to challenge the “Collective West” in about 12–15–20 years, around 2035+, but not now. Today, China is actually fighting the West through Russia, and it is fighting Russia through us.
China can influence the Putin regime, but China does not like the timing and manner of everything that is happening. China is very skeptical about the growth of food and energy prices. It lost significantly in GDP growth, and this is a challenge before the CPC congress this autumn. For China, the principle of territorial integrity plays a very important role. Therefore, I think the Chinese factor is very important, in particular, in terms of guarantees: whether China will agree to join some form of guarantees or whether it will offer its guarantees (and my point of view is that it will offer the way it did around the Budapest memorandum – China will not join anyone).
I support a rather difficult and debatable concept: a certain controlled presence of China here in Ukraine should have existed according to the principle “more China – less Russia,” but we missed this moment, so it will be quite difficult to return to it.
On the UN and new security mechanisms
After the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia, many people from our community, and they are, in my opinion, some of the best experts in their spheres, offered their help to the authorities at a high level to work together for the joint victory, not publicly but pro bono. And I see that the authorities have some imaginary fear of “sharing” the victory when it comes, at least in any format. We see how teams are formed and what the negotiation group looks like. Do you agree that not the most perfect people represent Ukraine on the negotiating team and that not the best experts are responding to all the challenges the country is currently facing?
Our nation has great intellectual potential, so it is necessary to engage everyone. Why does this not happen? There is either no wish or no trust. I believe that trust is the key story in this context.
I have a very quiet point of view regarding the composition of the negotiating team. I believe that it does not matter who is there. All decisions are still made in the Office of the President. Of course, the quality of the negotiators is important, but the main thing is the result. This will result in the responsibility for the negotiations, both for their official and unofficial parts. And which way this is to be represented is a different matter.
These negotiations themselves have an influence. For example, the influence on the supplies of weapons to Ukraine and the trust of Western partners in what Ukraine is negotiating on various platforms. Therefore, the issue concerns how transparent this process shall be. When we are currently discussing the necessary assistance to Ukraine with our Western partners, which they are ready to provide us, they express concern about the scenarios of Ukraine retreating from certain positions within the framework of informal negotiations, which they will not be aware of.
In today’s reality, it is very difficult to keep all conceptual informal negotiations confidential. What is the informal part? For example, the priority of certain scenarios in the future, options, the possibility of agreeing on certain supplies via third countries, the fate of some economic assets, the possibility of agreeing on security guarantees, both economic and personal, etc.
The problem is that the results of such conceptual, confidential negotiations can become known to everyone over time and block the results of official negotiations. This can really be the element of very significant concern for our partners. Today, Ukraine is in a state of war, and even later, it will critically depend on the West, so the danger of some confidential agreements is not critical. But you will not reach transparency through these conceptual or informal negotiations, this is how any negotiations are performed. Some things will manifest quickly, the others will not.
On “Crimean Scenario” in the southern oblasts of Ukraine
The preparation of referendums in the south and east of Ukraine is very similar to the “Crimean Scenario.” Several days before recognising the so-called “DPR” and “LPR” by the Russian Federation, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine stated that this would not happen. I guess we underestimate what is happening in the south because, tactically, Russia needs a land corridor and water; everyone knows this. And that’s why, not even within the limits of a great battle for Ukraine but within the limits of a small battle for Crimea, Russia strives to keep this territory, no matter how the scenario unfolds. If they quickly legitimise these territories (for example, in the form of the Kherson People’s Republic) and afterward include them in the composition of their lands and jurisdiction, we realise that there are no prospects for negotiations at all. The only possible way will be a military recapture of these territories, inevitably leading to escalation. How can this process be made impossible using diplomatic tools today?
As for the “Crimean Scenario” for the South of Ukraine, I believe that Russia wants to seize the territories to establish Novorossiya and include them in the so-called Allied State. What they did there and how they prepared for the occupation administrations in the South with the help of the FSB are all very systematic works. They are preparing referendums; there is a complete media cleaning, including all Russian channels. I believe that the Kremlin plans to hold a referendum simultaneously in all the occupied territories and present it as the “creation of Novorossiya.”
Therefore, I agree with you. They are not going to give anything back in the South; they want to cut us off from the sea. I recommend reading the article “What If Putin Is Not Looking To End This War?” which recently appeared on Substack. This article consciously simulates various options and, according to my information, personifies the FSB position in Putin’s environment. The person who wrote it formally exists, but it is fictitious. If you look closely, the author of this article formally works at Cambridge, but he signed up for a Twitter account at the beginning of April this year. In this article, the most important information is written between the lines.
On “demilitarisation” and “denazification.”
Without denying the point about the desire to restore the Soviet Union, in my opinion, “denazification” is directly related to Ukraine. If you listen to leading ideologists who talk about the goals of Russia’s war in Ukraine, they name “denazification” as one of these goals. De facto, behind this naming, there is liquidation of the Ukrainian identity as such, as well as the Ukrainian political community, which is based on this identity, and liquidation of the Ukrainian state. Accordingly, I think that in our case, Russia is interested not in integrating Ukraine, which preserves the Ukrainian national identity, but in the territory and its population, which will have a completely different identity.
I completely agree. The idea of “denazification” is the idea of destroying Ukrainian identity. My point was that “denazification” is also used to mobilise those segments of the population that can be conventionally called “collective Putin” and “collective Zhirinovsky.” This is a very specific lumpen with various “traditional values” that can be manipulated. And they are doing it rather actively.
It is an illusion that there can be guarantees other than Ukraine’s accession to NATO. It is difficult to imagine that there could be a separate agreement on nuclear defence with the United States. And I guess that relying on guarantees is merely calming ourselves down and creating a false impression of security.
I can’t entirely agree that there cannot be a bilateral security agreement with the USA that would stipulate sufficient guarantees for Ukraine. Such cases exist. Take South Korea or Japan, for example. This is a different perspective, but it’s possible. This option means a transitional process to NATO.
As for guarantees in the classical defence sense, it does not mean that they are not useful at all. The truth is that they are insufficient because they will not protect Ukraine from today’s [Russian] regime. But in general, they can be useful for elaborating political plans and political will in the West. There, all strategies for containment to weaken and isolate Russia are now being rewritten. This discussion has been ongoing for several weeks now, and based on the results of the Madrid NATO Summit [29–30 June], we will see interesting things. There must be guarantees; in the future world, there is no way without them. But what is being discussed today is an auxiliary tool and nothing more.
On peaceful agreement and the end of the war
On reparations
What international legal mechanism of using frozen assets and seized property of Russians do you see for reparations and restoration of Ukraine’s infrastructure?
I believe that international legal mechanisms will be less effective than decisions of national courts, such as American or British courts. In particular, it is used very well within Class action. Individuals and companies will file lawsuits for reimbursement, while national courts will pass judgments, directly and indirectly.
First, decisions of international courts will also be efficient, but last much longer. Second, what are the consequences, and where will they take place, considering that the Security Council will not call it a war? But it is worth saying, and this is the cynical truth of any agreement: if Russia agrees to the temporary truce, it will require cancelling certain sanctions and returning at least some of the assets, and I do not rule out that a significant part of the seized assets will be sacrificed to achieve the truce. This is one possibility, and it depends to a large extent on the situation at the front, on hybrid war, and on our social and economic stability.
To prevent the concept of betrayal from being possible, the authorities shall start telling the truth about what is happening, even where there is a real betrayal on the part of our representatives in OSA, the Security Service of Ukraine because it happens too. Eventually, many facts will immediately come to the surface. Are the authorities aware of this?
I think they do, although they may not know how fast it can be. Russia knows how to wage information wars and knows what to start with. Any victory in Ukraine quickly turns into betrayal and then into victory again. Ukrainians always have this Cossack emotion. This is a fantastic idea, but we need to understand that someone may use it.
