USPS. War Dialogues. Conversation With Pavlo Klimkin

The two factors – the COVID-2019 pandemic and the Russo-Ukrainian war started the reboot of the 20th century in the 21st. All those systems and architectural elements created after the Second World War are now pathologically dysfunctional. It is important to understand that returning to the status quo of European security and, moreover, global security is impossible.

There is an understanding that, first, Russia is no longer just a threat but a revanchist regime; second, Russia is a country where everything is done by Putin only; it is a pure dictatorship, not even an authoritarian state in the sense of foreign policy; third, the prejudice was not confirmed that the Russian population would not support the war if it was full-scale.

Only now has it become clear to everyone that this is not Putin, not some union of clans surrounded by Putin; this is Russia as it is. Awareness came that this Russia cannot be treated the way it was before; its containment makes no sense. But the main thing is that commitment to the model of economic interdependence, which was especially prevalent in Germany, did not guarantee the avoidance of aggressive actions by Russia.

The West has become more united since the full-scale invasion, but it has not changed. However, changes are inevitable. The West faces the acute problem of Putin’s dictatorship and China’s mega-challenge, which is still considered the challenge of the 21st century.

Our partners see the situation on the fronts and accordingly help us not to allow Putin to win by military means in Ukraine – this is the Western consensus today. The second consensus concerns the avoidance of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, particularly a nuclear conflict. The third consensus is that the West cannot admit that Russia received Ukraine under its influence, even indirectly, since, in geopolitical terms, this would mean not only strengthening Russia but also fundamentally strengthening China.

The problem is that they started supplying us with heavy weapons too late. I have the impression that a significant number of decision-makers, including in the States, did not fully believe in Ukrainian resistance, both military and civil. They believed that a certain option would be available on a significant part of Ukraine’s territory, somewhat like the “Afghan” scenario.

Today, I do not see any consensus in the West to legally give something from Ukraine to Russia. I understand that the complete restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity is possible under the condition of global events, such as Russia’s reboot. In the West, they say directly, although not publicly, that as a result of this war, if Russia collapses socially, economically, militarily, or as the result of other processes, then it will be possible to rely on the return of Crimea. In this sense, the answer is definite: territorial integrity is not declared during war as the principle.

We are also aware that we do not yet have weapons to carry out attacking operations to return to Crimea. This requires a completely different attacking weapon and intelligence provision, but most importantly, understanding that such an operation will be considered by the Russian regime as the “capture of a part of Russia,” which means that it requires a completely different level of preparation. Today, and I emphasize, today, I do not see any consensus in the West to support such an operation. This must be said honestly regarding what we can and cannot do.

China is now very uncomfortable with everything that Putin started. According to many indicators, China is ready to challenge the “Collective West” in about 12–15–20 years, around 2035+, but not now. Today, China is actually fighting the West through Russia, and it is fighting Russia through us.

China can influence the Putin regime, but China does not like the timing and manner of everything that is happening. China is very skeptical about the growth of food and energy prices. It lost significantly in GDP growth, and this is a challenge before the CPC congress this autumn. For China, the principle of territorial integrity plays a very important role. Therefore, I think the Chinese factor is very important, in particular, in terms of guarantees: whether China will agree to join some form of guarantees or whether it will offer its guarantees (and my point of view is that it will offer the way it did around the Budapest memorandum – China will not join anyone).

I support a rather difficult and debatable concept: a certain controlled presence of China here in Ukraine should have existed according to the principle “more China – less Russia,” but we missed this moment, so it will be quite difficult to return to it.

I believe that the UN has run dry. In today’s form, China and the US will try to keep this organisation, among other things, because they need the right to veto and have their own interests. Russia is violating the UN Charter, on the one hand, and it is trying to claim the right of veto and membership in the UN Security Council by referring to the Charter, on the other hand. That is, it is pure schizophrenia, both legal and political.

I believe the UN Security Council should be rebooted in general – it is not needed in its current form. Other options are needed, but it is being discussed today, which exactly. A different membership cannot replace the Security Council. A completely new mechanism is needed, and I believe that the future security model shall not be based on the full sovereignty of the national states. Structures with certain supranational powers must ensure the future security system in the world (it is not only about military security but also about environmental and medical security). Who can ensure this, and how? So far, this issue looks almost impossible. But there is no way without this.

Honestly speaking, dodging is necessary in any negotiation process, especially during wartime. This gives us some time, resources, supplies, and stability. After all, at the first stages of negotiations, where we were demanded to capitulate, this game and this dodging were normal. I intentionally avoid the question of whether such dodging is a real tactic, a desire to drag out time, or both. If you decide to collect all the statements of the Ukrainian side, you will understand that this cannot be our position, as there are fundamental contradictions. Therefore, this is a kind of game, which has its sense.

In my opinion, the key point in these negotiations is the “demilitarisation” of our security potential and the official legal recognition of occupied territories belonging to Russia.

Are there any issues that will not be discussed publicly? Yes, there are. A public dimension will always be written in the documents, which we all will see. There is also a non-public part, let’s call it “conceptual.” You, for example, see Abramovich only, but there are different channels and agreements. This is also an important part. And what we are discussing is not everything we have. Therefore, the game can make sense, and I do not see any disaster or betrayal here. The main thing is to have a clear strategy and understanding of what we are playing for, with whom we are playing, and which way we are playing.

Our nation has great intellectual potential, so it is necessary to engage everyone. Why does this not happen? There is either no wish or no trust. I believe that trust is the key story in this context.

I have a very quiet point of view regarding the composition of the negotiating team. I believe that it does not matter who is there. All decisions are still made in the Office of the President. Of course, the quality of the negotiators is important, but the main thing is the result. This will result in the responsibility for the negotiations, both for their official and unofficial parts. And which way this is to be represented is a different matter.

In today’s reality, it is very difficult to keep all conceptual informal negotiations confidential. What is the informal part? For example, the priority of certain scenarios in the future, options, the possibility of agreeing on certain supplies via third countries, the fate of some economic assets, the possibility of agreeing on security guarantees, both economic and personal, etc.

The problem is that the results of such conceptual, confidential negotiations can become known to everyone over time and block the results of official negotiations. This can really be the element of very significant concern for our partners. Today, Ukraine is in a state of war, and even later, it will critically depend on the West, so the danger of some confidential agreements is not critical. But you will not reach transparency through these conceptual or informal negotiations, this is how any negotiations are performed. Some things will manifest quickly, the others will not.

As for the “Crimean Scenario” for the South of Ukraine, I believe that Russia wants to seize the territories to establish Novorossiya and include them in the so-called Allied State. What they did there and how they prepared for the occupation administrations in the South with the help of the FSB are all very systematic works. They are preparing referendums; there is a complete media cleaning, including all Russian channels. I believe that the Kremlin plans to hold a referendum simultaneously in all the occupied territories and present it as the “creation of Novorossiya.”

Therefore, I agree with you. They are not going to give anything back in the South; they want to cut us off from the sea. I recommend reading the article “What If Putin Is Not Looking To End This War?” which recently appeared on Substack. This article consciously simulates various options and, according to my information, personifies the FSB position in Putin’s environment. The person who wrote it formally exists, but it is fictitious. If you look closely, the author of this article formally works at Cambridge, but he signed up for a Twitter account at the beginning of April this year. In this article, the most important information is written between the lines.

It is worth emphasising that neutrality and non-alignment are different things both in legal and geopolitical terms. I believe that any recording of neutrality is nothing more than a political rooting of the status quo. Even if we enshrine this in some legal documents, it will also be a recording of the status quo, which may, and I believe, will be revised at any moment. I am absolutely convinced that even if neutrality is prescribed, this is a temporary story. It will not exist in the future world; it will be dysfunctional. It can make sense as the position of negotiations and depends on the situation on the fronts. Therefore, in this matter, it is necessary to carefully accelerate betrayal or victory.

We have now realised that we are the best guarantees of our security, as well as our fighting spirit, our military capacity, and our equipment with modern weapons. In general, any discussion on the so-called “demilitarisation” shall be limited to a checklist called Confidence-Building Measures. I consider this to be the only acceptance moment for a discussion. It is obvious that any agreement can only be a part of some larger agreement between the West and Russia.

One more thing that Russia is talking about is “denazification.” The goal is clear – it is not really connected with Ukraine, but sooner with the cult of entrenched fascist values, which are called traditional values there. By the way, if you compare Mussolini’s regime with today’s Russian regime, you will find a lot of common features: the idealisation of the past and concentration on it, the destruction of opponents, the worship of a single personality who has semi-magical qualities and a special mission. In Moscow, they realise that it is necessary to destroy the passionarity of Ukrainian society, and the nonsense about “denazification” is exactly about this.

Putin and the Russian leadership absolutely consciously want to build an allied state as a certain reincarnation of the USSR. On 30 December this year, the USSR will celebrate its 100th anniversary. I am sure that the plan was to unite Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan (events that happened at the beginning of the year in Kazakhstan were part of this failed plan), and Ukraine into an Allied State. And, of course, let us add everything happening in Abkhazia and Transnistria.

The desire to unite all this into the Allied State, to present it as Putin’s mission, and mobilise Russians is the conscious logic. Putin’s key demand is to recognise the temporarily occupied Crimea and Donbas within their administrative borders. He needs this to accelerate the wave of betrayal mood in Ukraine and then destabilise the situation.

I completely agree. The idea of “denazification” is the idea of destroying Ukrainian identity. My point was that “denazification” is also used to mobilise those segments of the population that can be conventionally called “collective Putin” and “collective Zhirinovsky.” This is a very specific lumpen with various “traditional values” that can be manipulated. And they are doing it rather actively.

Any guarantees, whether written or not, make no basis for being calm. What is important is not the content of these guarantees, but rather who will invest in their implementation.

Real guarantees for Ukraine in today’s world are either guarantees within NATO, guarantees within the US nuclear umbrella, or automatic sanctions with a clearly defined scope at the level of complete isolation of Russia. But today, there is no political will to impose these sanctions.

The best option for us until Ukraine joins NATO is the nuclear umbrella. In this sense, the best we can have is a bilateral security agreement with the US. I stress, not some memoranda, but a security agreement. The best scenario is the placement of the American troops and infrastructure elements in the territory of Ukraine.

I can’t entirely agree that there cannot be a bilateral security agreement with the USA that would stipulate sufficient guarantees for Ukraine. Such cases exist. Take South Korea or Japan, for example. This is a different perspective, but it’s possible. This option means a transitional process to NATO.

As for guarantees in the classical defence sense, it does not mean that they are not useful at all. The truth is that they are insufficient because they will not protect Ukraine from today’s [Russian] regime. But in general, they can be useful for elaborating political plans and political will in the West. There, all strategies for containment to weaken and isolate Russia are now being rewritten. This discussion has been ongoing for several weeks now, and based on the results of the Madrid NATO Summit [29–30 June], we will see interesting things. There must be guarantees; in the future world, there is no way without them. But what is being discussed today is an auxiliary tool and nothing more.

By the end of the year, Putin has to demonstrate at least a shortened version of Novorossiya. He will try to seize territories that can be “sold” as Novorossiya. And then, these territories and threats, such as weapons of mass destruction, will be traded to obtain the result during the negotiations that would permanently place us in a state of crisis.

A peace agreement with today’s Russia is impossible because the Russian leadership aims for Ukraine to not exist as such. This is not only a matter of territories. When someone wants to destroy you, how can you sign a peace agreement?

There will be no endgame in the sense of a peace agreement. This will be a sequence of separate temporary status quos consisting of complex negotiations. The status quo will depend, first of all, on the situation in the east, south, and central parts of Ukraine. And even more so on our economic and social stability.

I think there will be some kind of temporary ceasefire, then maybe a temporary truce. There will be negotiations at different platforms, not just one. Guarantees and security will be discussed separately, but some issues will also be discussed, not publicly. And for the coming years, this regime will pursue its key goal, unless it is destroyed in some way – politically or economically.

I believe that international legal mechanisms will be less effective than decisions of national courts, such as American or British courts. In particular, it is used very well within Class action. Individuals and companies will file lawsuits for reimbursement, while national courts will pass judgments, directly and indirectly.

First, decisions of international courts will also be efficient, but last much longer. Second, what are the consequences, and where will they take place, considering that the Security Council will not call it a war? But it is worth saying, and this is the cynical truth of any agreement: if Russia agrees to the temporary truce, it will require cancelling certain sanctions and returning at least some of the assets, and I do not rule out that a significant part of the seized assets will be sacrificed to achieve the truce. This is one possibility, and it depends to a large extent on the situation at the front, on hybrid war, and on our social and economic stability.

From the moment Ukraine receives the candidate country status for joining the EU, the role of civil society will significantly increase. There will be many opportunities, and it is important that civil society does not fight over different projects. Unity is very important during the post-war period, when there is a truce or a cease-fire because it will be a difficult socio-economic situation.

I would like to emphasise that Russia’s main strategy is further social destabilisation and accelerating faithfulness. People will be tired. Recall what happened in different countries after the great wars. Therefore, the post-war period is not less important than the war period, and we need to be visionary and resolute. Civil society in Ukraine is one of the best. We need to consider this and speak about the future harshly but creatively.

I think they do, although they may not know how fast it can be. Russia knows how to wage information wars and knows what to start with. Any victory in Ukraine quickly turns into betrayal and then into victory again. Ukrainians always have this Cossack emotion. This is a fantastic idea, but we need to understand that someone may use it.