A World Divided by the Strait of Hormuz: How the Middle East Changed After 28 February

Following 28 February, when the United States, together with Israel, launched a military operation against Iran, the Middle East entered a phase of direct confrontation that had long been avoided. What had previously taken the form of proxy conflicts — in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen — has escalated into open warfare, including strikes on Iranian territory itself.

This confrontation did not emerge suddenly. Relations between the United States and Iran have remained adversarial since the late twentieth century, particularly following the Islamic Revolution, which shaped the country’s modern political system. At its core lies the principle of velayat-e faqih — the supreme authority of a religious leader who stands above all branches of government.

Formally, Iran combines republican institutions — a president, government and parliament — with theocratic oversight. In practice, however, the balance of power has always depended on the security apparatus and proximity to the Supreme Leader.

After 28 February, this balance appears to have shifted decisively.

Even prior to the current escalation, Iran had suffered significant losses in the region — particularly following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the weakening of its allies. The new phase of the conflict has only intensified these dynamics: Iran now finds itself under direct strikes on its own territory, which has further radicalised its domestic politics.

The culmination of the current confrontation was the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the transfer of power to his son — an event that may formally appear to follow procedure, but in practice signifies a transformation in the very nature of the regime.

To better understand who now effectively holds power in Iran, whether there is a risk of internal destabilisation, and why the United States may have found itself in a strategic trap, we spoke with Ihor Semvolos, Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies and lecturer at the Ukrainian School of Political Studies.

The interview was conducted on 21 March.

The White House has justified the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East by citing concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme and its growing regional influence. For years, the United States and Israel have maintained that Tehran was close to developing nuclear weapons and that its stockpile of enriched uranium could pose a direct threat to their security.  At the same time, experts note that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme was largely pragmatic in nature. Tehran viewed it as leverage in negotiations — a means of trading technological capacity and resources for sanctions relief — rather than as a direct preparation for war. The United States, however, interpreted this as a strategic threat and steadily increased pressure on Iran through diplomacy, sanctions and a strengthened military presence in the region.

Ihor Semvolos notes that the war — which was framed as a response to a nuclear threat — has far broader causes. ‘This is a highly speculative issue. Iran’s nuclear programme was used as a bargaining tool in negotiations,’ he says.

Following the 2015 agreement, Iran gained access to additional resources and channelled them into expanding its regional influence. ‘By 2019–2020, they effectively controlled a significant part of the Middle East — Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen,’ Semvolos notes. This escalation heightened tensions with the United States and Israel and ultimately led to a shift in strategy: ‘From containment to the dismantling of Iran’s capabilities.’

On the timing of the war, the Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies explains that it was carefully calculated. By late February, it had already become clear that the conflict was inevitable, but the exact moment of its outbreak was shaped by a combination of internal and strategic factors. ‘I believed the most opportune moment to launch the war would be the end of spring, due to the systemic collapse of Iran’s banking sector, which could have disrupted payments to the military. According to expert assessments, around 60 days for rank-and-file personnel and 90 days for officers is the critical threshold at which systemic failures begin to emerge within the vertical of power,’ he explains.

The final trigger, however, was intelligence on the location of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his inner circle in a specific bunker. According to the expert, ‘the concept was that eliminating key figures in a single strike would cause the system to collapse’. In this sense, the war began on 28 February as a result of a convergence of internal economic pressures, strategic calculations and intelligence inputs. Neither side — Iran nor the United States — was prepared to compromise, particularly on issues related to Israel.

Did this approach work?

Following the killing of Ali Khamenei, power passed to his son, Mojtaba. Formally, the process followed established procedures: the Assembly of Experts voted, and a majority supported his candidacy.

‘From a strictly legal standpoint, everything is in order. But in spirit, this is a serious violation, as we are witnessing a de facto transfer of power from father to son. Of course, this has happened in the context of what is an existential war for Iran, but there is considerable opposition to such a decision. Many are against it, although their voices are far less audible now, given that real decision-making power currently lies with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,’ Ihor Semvolos explains.

Under the system’s ‘normal’ logic, the Supreme Leader is meant to be selected as a religious authority, rather than through hereditary succession. For this reason, many within Iran view the current transition as a departure from its foundational principles.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which now effectively holds power, is far more than a military structure. Established after the revolution as a mechanism to safeguard the regime, it has since evolved into one of the country’s most influential institutions. The IRGC maintains its own armed forces, controls a significant share of the economy, and plays a central role in foreign policy, particularly through its support for allied groups across the region.

It is precisely this structure, the expert argues, that now determines Iran’s political course.

‘If you look at the statements of President Masoud Pezeshkian or Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, they are often at odds with the actions of the Corps. As a result, the executive branch is losing its agency. The President and his cabinet have become largely symbolic. Within the Corps itself, decisions are likely made by a narrow circle of military figures — the so-called “Habib circle” — individuals close to Mojtaba Khamenei since the Iran–Iraq war. It is reasonable to assume that this circle has now expanded significantly,’ says Ihor Semvolos.

He describes this shift in power as a ‘soft military coup’. This raises a logical question:

Under such conditions, internal political competition has all but disappeared.

At the outset of the conflict, there were signals from what might be described as the ‘systemic opposition’ — segments of the elite that had fallen out of power. Some of its representatives, even while in detention, proposed revising the Constitution as a way out of the crisis.

‘But these signals never gained traction,’ the expert notes.

The reason is tight control.

‘The population is unlikely to take to the streets at this stage for one simple reason: cities are operating under a strict counterintelligence regime, and any public gathering would be treated as a betrayal of the Corps. The Basij [a volunteer paramilitary militia subordinate to the IRGC] have orders to shoot to kill. Opposition groups abroad are urging people to stay at home,’ Semvolos explains.

Within the opposition in exile, a key figure has emerged — Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah. According to the Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, he has been acting in a relatively structured and systematic way. Beyond high-profile international engagements, including meetings with the President of Ukraine, Pahlavi is attempting to build governance structures that could begin functioning immediately in the event of regime change. How successful these efforts will be remains uncertain.

‘I think it will be a difficult process,’ Semvolos adds, noting that, on the one hand, Pahlavi faces resistance from parts of the opposition who view him as harbouring ambitions for power and potentially seeking to restore the monarchy. On the other hand, alternative opposition structures are, at present, objectively weaker than Pahlavi.

An important constraint is the lack of broad domestic support for Pahlavi. While there have recently been reports of arrests of monarchist supporters and the emergence of certain pro-Pahlavi groups, it remains difficult to assess the true scale of these developments. Some of these trends also include demonstrative actions — such as videos showing alleged oaths of allegiance by ‘50,000 soldiers’ — which appear more as elements of propaganda than evidence of real military backing.

At the same time, other opposition initiatives exist that seek to influence constitutional and state mechanisms. For now, however, their impact remains minimal. The physical constraints faced by the opposition — with the vast majority of activists imprisoned — significantly limit their capacity. Recent letters, which are likely to reflect a collective position among detainees, are largely symbolic rather than capable of shifting the situation. Under conditions where the country is moving towards a form of military dictatorship, any attempts to convene constituent assemblies or organise alternative governance structures are, at present, unrealistic.

At this stage, further escalation appears to be the most plausible scenario. A key factor is control over the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic route for global oil and gas transportation. Iran is actively using this corridor as a lever of pressure: any strikes on its energy infrastructure could be met with retaliatory actions targeting the capacities of Arab states, which in turn would have a significant impact on the global economy.

‘To reopen the Strait and ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil, it would have to be brought under control through a ground operation — there are no viable alternatives,’ explains Ihor Semvolos.

However, such an operation would inevitably trigger further escalation. In this scenario, the United States risks falling into a strategic trap: battlefield losses — to which the US is particularly sensitive — could be significant, while Iran appears prepared to absorb a much higher threshold of human casualties.

At the same time, the behaviour of the US leadership is adding to the uncertainty. On the one hand, statements circulated via social media suggest a complete victory and the end of operations; on the other hand, the movement of Marine forces points to preparations for a potential ground operation, either on key islands or in the Strait itself.

‘This may be intended either as a signal to the adversary or as domestic political messaging. For now, however, the Iranians are not reacting — they are interested in prolonging the conflict and ultimately undermining American ambitions in the region,’ the expert notes.

Without resolving two key issues — control over the Strait and the question of enriched uranium — it is impossible to speak of a strategic victory for the United States. Any attempt to return to the status quo would be perceived as a defeat, which is why further escalation currently appears almost inevitable. Iran remains an active player: its influence has not diminished, and potential setbacks for the United States could prompt a shift in the positions of Arab states and encourage the rise of new regional actors. China could significantly expand its role. It has been actively positioning itself as a guarantor of secure oil transportation while deepening cooperation with both Iran and the Gulf states. As the expert notes, US expectations of a swift victory have so far not materialised: Donald Trump appears to have sought to use the conflict as leverage in negotiations with China, but the strategic cards have not, at this stage, played out in his favour.

‘This war undoubtedly creates risks, but it also allows Ukraine to demonstrate its capabilities and political influence,’ says Ihor Semvolos.

At the same time, the conflict opens up new opportunities for Ukraine. Unlike conflicts in Palestine or Sudan, the current situation enables the country to assert itself as an independent actor on the global stage.

In Semvolos’s view, Ukraine’s initiatives in the field of security and defence go beyond purely utilitarian assistance. They contribute to the emergence of a new geopolitical dimension — reinforcing Ukrainian sovereignty and creating a unique model of transferring operational expertise. This is not something that can be bought; it can only be shared through direct human interaction. In this respect, Ukraine’s approach differs from the American model, which is primarily based on the provision of weapons and financial guarantees.

An important element of this process is the autonomy of Ukraine’s policy from Washington. The expert stresses that while the US public position is well known, in practice, Ukraine is acting independently, shaping its own strategic trajectory — a factor that is crucial for its agency and sovereignty.

‘This region, these developments — they are an opportunity for Ukraine, and it should be seized,’ he adds.

Despite the complexity of the situation, he emphasises that Ukraine still lacks a sufficient understanding of the region.

‘For some reason, we continue to underestimate Iran, perceiving it as backward and impoverished. That is clearly not the case — this is a very powerful and wealthy region, and this should not be overlooked,’ the expert notes.

For this reason, he argues, it is important not only to respond to events, but also to interpret them within a broader context — as part of an emerging global reality that is still taking shape.